










OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS FOR A WORKER 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1282 
CATEGORY 4: LABOR MARKETS 
SEPTEMBER 2004 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO VENICE SUMMER INSTITUTE, 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1282 
 
 
OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS FOR A WORKER 






A worker’s utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with 
his employer’s income. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased 
effort by the worker little increases the income of his employer. This paper uses a principal-
agent model to study optimal incentive contracts for envious workers under various 
assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives 
on effort and, therefore, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make 
profitsharing optimal, even when the worker’s effort is fully contractible. We discuss several 
applications of our theoretical work. For example, envy can explain why lower-level workers 
are awarded stock options, why incentive pay is usually lower in non-profit organizations, and 
higher in larger firms. Envy may also make governmental production of a good more efficient 
than private production. 
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Envy appears in all ethnographically or historically recorded human societies
(Brown (1991, 1999)). Experimental evidence for envious feelings is provided
by Camerer (2003): subjects whose brains were imaged while presented with
an unfair oﬀer showed greater activity in the bilateral anterior insula of the
brain, revealing that such an oﬀer created negative emotions. Experimental
studies by economists also suggest that fairness considerations are important
determinants of human behavior (see the survey by Fehr and Schmidt (2003)).
Even monkeys appear to react with anger to unequal reward distributions
(Brosnan and de Waal (2003)).
This paper considers the implications of envy for optimal incentive con-
tracts. We shall consider a worker who envies his employer’s or boss’s wealth,
and who recognizes that increased eﬀort may enrich his employer or boss.
Such feelings explain the rage of workers at American Airlines and at Delta
Air Lines in 2003 who learned of bonuses for senior executives at the same
time that workers were asked to accept wage cuts. Greenberg (1990) ﬁnds
empirical evidence that employee theft increases when workers consider their
pay to be inequitable. Survey evidence also shows that workers care about
how their wage compares to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and that managers fear quits
and reduced eﬀort when the wage paid is ‘unfair’ (Agell and Lundborg (1995),
Bewley (1999)).
One might think that envy is irrelevant to eﬀort, since the worker will be
paid just enough to yield his reservation utility, with envy merely increasing
his pay. But that need not hold. For after an envious person accepts a job,
he may be unwilling to work hard even if the reward for his eﬀort exceeds
t h ec o s to fe ﬀort. If a worker is paid the value of his marginal product, then
an increase in his eﬀort enriches only himself. But if the worker is paid less,
then his increased eﬀort would increase the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, and so possibly
increase the wealth of the boss or of the owner. That in turn means that
the more high-powered the incentives oﬀered a worker, the less the worker’s
incentive to limit eﬀort because of envy.
A worker may be paid less than his marginal product for several reasons.
One is that high marginal compensation can cause a moral hazard problem
(a person paid handsomely to ﬁght ﬁres may commit arson). Another reason
may be that if a producer incurs ﬁxed costs, and the worker cannot pay
a large lump-sum to the employer, then a wage equal to marginal product
would generate losses to the producer. Lastly, as in the standard principal-
1agent model that we adopt in this paper, a risk-averse worker may prefer his
compensation to vary little with his output.
We study proﬁt-maximizing incentive contracts for envious workers under
various assumptions about the object and the generality of envy. The worker
m a ye n v yt h ee m p l o y e r ’ sp r o ﬁts. This envy of proﬁts may also be seen as
describing a spiteful worker rather than an envious one. Alternatively, envy
may depend on relative income. Further, we distinguish between speciﬁc
envy and general envy. Speciﬁc envy arises when the worker personally con-
tributes to his employer’s wealth (this represents a ‘warm glow,’ or, perhaps
more appropriately, a ‘cold shiver’). Alternatively, the worker may envy an
employer regardless of whether he works for him; we call this general envy.
We shall see that envy ampliﬁes the eﬀect of incentive pay on eﬀort, so
that optimal incentive pay is higher when workers are envious. Further-
more, even when eﬀort is fully contractible, the optimal contract may call
for incentive pay. Though such proﬁt-sharing increases the risk borne by the
worker, it may reduce the expected utility loss from envy, making the job
more attractive to the worker, and so reduce the wage paid.
Our theoretical work contributes to a better understanding of several
stylized facts. First, envy may explain why lower-level workers are awarded
stock options even though any one individual worker’s eﬀort hardly aﬀects
the stock price. Second, we argue that envy can cause for-proﬁt ﬁrms to
provide stronger monetary incentives to workers than do non-proﬁt ﬁrms.
Third, envy can explain why wages increase with the size of the employer.
Fourth, envy can make public production of a good more eﬃcient than private
production.
2L i t e r a t u r e
Our discussion of envy relates to concern about relative status, as well studied
by Frank (1984, 1985). He argues that a worker may prefer a job at ﬁrm
A which pays less than a job at ﬁrm B, if the wage ﬁrm A oﬀe r si sh i g h
compared to what it pays others. Workers’ concerns about their relative
standing in the ﬁrm may therefore imply that a highly productive worker
at a ﬁrm with many low-productivity workers may be paid less than his
marginal product. Likewise, a worker with low productivity must be paid a
compensating wage diﬀerential for enduring a low-status position amongst his
co-workers. Fershtman, Hvide, and Weiss (2003) examine how such concern
2about relative status aﬀects workers’ eﬀort and aﬀects the pay package a ﬁrm
should oﬀer. Status concerns increase eﬀort and may result in a ‘rat race’
among workers.1
Other papers assume that people dislike inequity or inequality (Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). That is, instead of agents
valuing a high-status position, they feel compassion for lower ranked agents,
and feel envy towards higher ranked agents. Several recent papers explore
optimal incentive contracts when workers feel envy and compassion towards
co-workers. (See Bartling and Von Siemens (2003), Biel (2002), Demougin
and Fluet (2003), Grund and Sliwka (2003), Itoh (2004), and Neilson and
Stowe (2003)).
For our purpose, it is immaterial whether people value high status (as in
Frank (1985)) or suﬀer from it (as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and related
work). In contrast to these papers, we ignore envy towards co-workers and,
instead, focus on envy of the boss. As workers rarely earn more than their
boss (professional sports may be an exception), our analysis ignores this
possibility and, consequently, need not consider how agents feel when they
are relatively better oﬀ.2
A few papers examine optimal contracts when workers envy their em-
ployer. Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2001) study
the employer’s choice of contractual incompleteness in a model where both
the worker and the employer may care about fairness. The presence of fair-
minded employers can make an incomplete bonus contract optimal, as fair-
minded employers reward hard work with a bonus. Selﬁsh employers mimic
the contract oﬀered by fair employers, but pay no bonus. In such a setting
fair-minded workers (who face an additional utility loss, increased inequality,
when the employer appears to be of the selﬁsh type and does not pay the
bonus) may exert less eﬀort than selﬁsh workers.
More closely related to our analysis is Englmaier and Wambach (2002).
They study optimal incentive contracts when workers dislike inequality and
employers are selﬁsh. The authors concentrate on determining whether the
1A similar eﬀect appears when people want to ‘keep up with the Joneses;’ see Dupor
and Liu (2003).
2We also abstract from positive feelings or from feelings of obligation toward the em-
ployer, which are prominent in Akerlof’s (1982) model of the gift-exchange, and in Rabin’s
(1993) model of reciprocity; see Rotemberg (2002) for a survey. Further, we do not con-
sider workers’ promotions to a managing position. When a worker’s chance of promotion
increases in his eﬀort, envy may increase eﬀort; see Grund and Sliwka (2003).
3incentive contract is linear in output, ﬁnding conditions under which it is.
Since we assume two possible outcomes (output is either High or Low), that
is not our focus. Instead, we shall focus on the implications of envy for the
power of the incentive scheme, for total wage compensation, and for worker’s
eﬀort.
We diﬀer from their work and other work (e.g. Itoh (2004)) in three
ways. First, we focus on workers who are never richer than their bosses. We
show that because envy ampliﬁes the eﬀect of incentives on eﬀort, optimal
incentive pay is higher when envy is present.
Second, we explicitly consider whether a person envies a boss only when
he works under him, or whether he envies the boss’s wealth even if someone
else works under that boss. These two diﬀerent types of envy have diﬀerent
implications for a worker’s participation constraint, and therefore diﬀerent
implications for the wage contract a ﬁrm will oﬀer.
Third, we apply the idea to new issues, including why lower-level work-
ers are awarded stock options, and why government generally oﬀers lower-
p o w e r e di n c e n t i v e st h a nd of o r - p r o ﬁt ﬁrms.
3 Assumptions
Consider the following principal-agent model. A risk-neutral employer hires a
risk-averse worker. The employer aims to maximize proﬁts, Π.P r o ﬁts equal
t h ew o r k e r ’ so u t p u tm i n u st h ew a g ep a i d( t h ep r i c eo fo u t p u ti sn o r m a l i z e d
to one). The worker chooses eﬀort e.T h e w o r k e r ’ s e ﬀort yields output H
with probability φ(e) and yields output L with probability [1 − φ(e)],w i t h
φ
0(e) > 0 and φ
00(e) ≤ 0. The cost of eﬀort to the worker is c(e),w i t h
c0(e) > 0 and c00(e) > 0. We examine optimal contract design when eﬀort is
contractible and when it is not. Output is always contractible; the worker is
paid wi when output is i.T h u s ,wL is the base salary and wH − wL is the
bonus or incentive pay.
The worker’s income, cost of eﬀort, and envy are separable in the utility
function:
U = u(w) − c(e) − γv(x), (1)
with u0(w) > 0 and u00 (w) ≤ 0. The function v(x) represents envious feelings,
with γ the weight on envy in the worker’s utility function, v0 (x) > 0,a n d
v00 (x) ≥ 0.
4The simplest assumption about the object of envy is that the worker’s
utility declines with his employer’s proﬁts (x = Π). This envy of proﬁts may
also be seen as describing a spiteful worker rather than an envious one.3
Alternatively, in Section 5 we model envy as increasing with the diﬀerence
in income between the employer and the worker (x = Π − w).
3.1 Speciﬁce n v y
We analyze the consequences of two diﬀerent assumptions about how envy
aﬀects the worker’s participation constraint. One assumption is that a worker
envies an employer only if the worker personally contributes to his employer’s
wealth. This is the ‘cold shiver’ assumption; it resembles the ‘warm glow’
assumption used in some analyses of the private provision of a public good,
where a person cares about both aggregate provision and his own contri-
bution.4 We shall be succinct by calling this speciﬁc envy. Under this as-
sumption, a person who is self-employed or unemployed suﬀers no envy. Let
t h ew o r k e r ’ si n c o m eb ew, and let his eﬀort be e when choosing the outside
option. Then the envy-free utility when choosing the outside option is
U = u(w) − c(e).
The participation constraint is
E[u(w) − c(e) − γv(x)] ≥ U.
where E is the expectation operator.5We shall see that such speciﬁce n v y
always makes behavior diﬀer from what it would be in the absence of envy.
3Note, however, that if v(·) is linear, x = Π is behaviorally equivalent to x = Π − U
and to x = Π − u(w) − c(e).T h a t i s , w h e n v(·) is linear, assuming that the worker’s
utility decreases in proﬁts is equivalent to assuming that the worker’s envy increases in
the diﬀerence between the employer’s proﬁts and the worker’s utility. When v(·) is convex,
and x = Π − U, we cannot solve the model analytically.
Varian (1974) deﬁnes an allocation as envy-free when no agent prefers any other agent’s
consumption-leisure bundle to his own. Hence, the more time executives spend at work,
the less workers will envy them for a given diﬀerence in consumption bundles. We abstract
from employer’s eﬀort. Our qualitative results continue to hold, however, if the worker
envies his boss, even if the worker takes into account the boss’s eﬀort.
4Important papers on the ‘warm glow’ in provision of a public good include Arrow
1972; Andreoni 1989, 1990; Cornes and Sandler 1984; Kingma 1989; Roberts 1987.
5We assume that income and eﬀort are certain when choosing the outside option. As
seen in Section 5, this does not aﬀect our results, except when envy is general and depends
on relative income.
53.2 General envy
The alternate assumption is that a worker envies the employer in question
regardless of whether he works for him.6We call this general envy. Let a
worker’s expected disutility from envy when outside the ﬁrm be Ev(xe).
The participation constraint is then
E[u(w) − c(e) − γv(x)] ≥ U − γEv(xe).
When workers are homogeneous, each realizes that, in equilibrium, the em-
ployer’s proﬁts are independent of who he hires. Hence, when envy depends
only on proﬁts (x = Π), the value of Ev(x) equals the value of Ev(xe).T h i s
makes the participation constraint E[u(w) − c(e)] ≥ U, which is indepen-
dent of envy. When, however, envy increases with the diﬀerence in income
(x = Π − w), and the wage at the ﬁrm can diﬀer from income under the
outside option (w), the expected disutility from envy may diﬀer inside and
outside the for-proﬁt ﬁrm. General envy then directly aﬀects the decision to
take the job.
For future reference, let β =0for general envy (that is, when envy arises
even when another worker takes the job) and β =1for speciﬁce n v y .W r i t e
the worker’s participation constraint as
E[u(w) − c(e) − γv(x)] ≥ U − (1 − β)γEv(xe). (2)
We study the polar cases of speciﬁc envy and general envy, by letting β
equal 1 or 0; a more general analysis would let it take intermediate values.
Thus, a computer programmer working for Sun or for Oracle may envy the
wealth of Bill Gates; but perhaps someone at Microsoft envies him even more.
The balance between speciﬁc and general envy may also depend on where
a person lives. A worker in New York City may notice so many wealthy
employers that he little envies any one employer unless he works for him.
But a worker in a small city can be highly aware of a boss’s wealth even
when not working for him. So speciﬁc envy may be more common in large
6It is straightforward to extend the utility function to allow for envious feelings towards
more than one employer. This does not aﬀect our results when envy increases only with
proﬁts. When envy increases with relative income, a worker who tries to reduce his
envy of other employers, for which he does not work, will increase his eﬀort. In other
words, allowing for more employers in the model would introduce a ‘keeping up with the
employers’-eﬀect.
6cities and large countries, and general envy more common in smaller cities
and smaller countries.
In the following we shall consider the solutions that arise under diﬀer-
ent assumptions: a worker’s envy can be speciﬁc or general; his envy may
depend either on the employer’s proﬁts or else on the diﬀerence between
the employer’s proﬁts and the worker’s income; the pay can be contingent
on both eﬀort and output (eﬀort is contractible) or else (because eﬀort is
not contractible) only on output. This gives eight diﬀerent possibilities to
consider.
4 Envy increases with employer’s proﬁts
4.1 Contractible eﬀort
We start by allowing pay to increase with both the worker’s eﬀort and his
output. When eﬀort is thus contractible, the principal-agent problem is
simple. In the standard model with risk-averse but non-envious workers,
the proﬁt-maximizing contract pays the worker a ﬁxed wage (so that the
ﬁrm bears all the risk) and demands an eﬀort level such that the worker’s
marginal cost of eﬀort equals the ﬁrm’s expected marginal revenue from that
eﬀort. As we will see, when a worker envies his boss, the optimal contract
may impose some of the risk on the worker.
The employer’s optimization problem is
max
e,wH,wL
φ(e)(H − wH)+[ 1− φ(e)](L − wL) subject to (2).
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
φ
0(e)[H − L − wH + wL]+λ{φ
0(e)[u(wH) − u(wL)] − c
0(e)}
−λβγφ
0(e)[v(H − wH) − v(L − wL)] = 0 (3)
−φ(e)+λ[φ(e)u
0 (wH)+βγφ(e)v
0(H − wH)] = 0 (4)
−[1 − φ(e)] + λ{[1 − φ(e)]u
0 (wL)+βγ[1 − φ(e)]v
0(L − wL)} =0 (5)
φ(e)u(wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]u(wL) − c(e)
−βγ{φ(e)v(H − wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]v(L − wL)} = U, (6)
7where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
In these equations, β and γ always appear as βγ. Therefore under gen-
eral envy (β =0 ) the weight of envy in utility (γ) is irrelevant, and so envy
here has no eﬀect. The neutrality arises because the contractibility of eﬀort
eﬀectively makes the worker’s only decision whether to participate. In equi-
librium, the worker realizes that the employer’s proﬁts are independent of
who is hired. As he will envy the employer anyway, envy is irrelevant for the
worker’s participation decision. In contrast, with speciﬁce n v y( β =1 ), the
worker can avoid feelings of envy by choosing the envy-free outside option.
Then, as is clear from the participation constraint, (6), for a given level of
eﬀort, the worker must be compensated for the utility loss of envy, and so
envy increases the worker’s pay.7
Combining (4) and (5) characterizes the optimal pay schedule:
u
0 (wL) − u
0 (wH)=βγ[v
0(H − wH) − v
0(L − wL)]. (7)
The result follows intuition: when workers are risk-averse and lack envy
(γ =0 ), or when workers are risk-averse and suﬀer from general envy (β =0 ),
a ﬁxed wage (wH = wL)i so p t i m a l .Aﬁxed wage places all the risk on the
employer; because the employer is risk neutral, this is optimal. With speciﬁc
envy, however, if the marginal utility loss from envy increases with proﬁts
(v00 > 0), a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm will share proﬁts (and thus risk) with
the worker. The intuition lies with the observation that when the marginal
disutility from envy increases with proﬁts, the worker suﬀers much more
when proﬁt sa r eh i g ht h a nw h e np r o ﬁts are low. With a ﬁxed wage, proﬁts
a r eh i g hw h e no u t p u ti sh i g ha n dl o ww h e no u t p u ti sl o w .T h ee m p l o y e rc a n
increase the worker’s expected utility, and so reduce the worker’s expected
total compensation, by paying more when output and proﬁts are high, and
paying less when output and proﬁts are low. Such proﬁt-sharing increases
the employer’s expected proﬁts.8T h ec o s to fp r o ﬁt-sharing is the increased
risk borne by the worker. The optimal contract trades oﬀ this cost and
7Clearly, with speciﬁce n v ya n dh i g hγ, the expected wage may exceed expected rev-
enues, and so the ﬁrm may hire no worker. Envy may thus obstruct an otherwise mutually
beneﬁcial relation. Throughout the paper, we focus on interior solutions.
8Notice that when v(Π) is linear, the expected utility loss from envy always increases
with expected proﬁts. Hence, the only way to reduce the worker’s expected disutility from
envy, and thereby relax his participation constraint, is to reduce expected proﬁts; this
clearly hurts the employer. The convexity of v(·) implies that proﬁt-sharing can reduce
the expected utility loss from envy even though expected proﬁts for the employer increase.
8the beneﬁt of reduced envy. In the extreme case of a risk neutral worker,
(7) implies that the optimal bonus equals the full marginal product of the
worker (wH − wL = H − L).
Combining these results with the ﬁrst-order condition for eﬀort (3) shows
that speciﬁce n v ya ﬀects eﬀort, whereas general envy does not. Note that
if expected proﬁts increase with eﬀort, speciﬁc envy makes it more costly to
induce a worker to exert eﬀort (see the last term in (3)). This, however, has
no implications for the optimal level of eﬀort speciﬁed in the contract: envy is
like a tax on proﬁts, the higher are the proﬁts the more must the ﬁrm pay the
worker. But just as a tax on proﬁts does not change the proﬁt-maximizing
level of output, it does not change the proﬁt-maximizing level of eﬀort.
The presence of envy can, however, indirectly aﬀect the eﬀort the ﬁrm
wants to induce. First, the presence of speciﬁc envy causes the ﬁrm to
compensate the worker with higher pay. When the worker’s utility is concave
in income, the increase in pay reduces the worker’s marginal utility from
income, and so increases the marginal cost to the ﬁrm of increasing the
worker’s eﬀort. Optimal eﬀort is therefore less than in the absence of envy.
Second, envy can make proﬁt-sharing optimal. The worker then faces
risk, the marginal beneﬁto fe ﬀort to the worker changes, and the employer
adjusts the induced eﬀo r tt or e d u c et h er i s kb o r n eb yt h ew o r k e r .N o t et h a t ,
for a given incentive wage, risk is highest when φ(e)=1 /2. Whether eﬀort
is higher or lower therefore depends on the equilibrium level of φ(e) in the
absence of envy. When φ(e) < 1/2,p r o ﬁt-sharing involves a reduction in
eﬀort so as to reduce risk; the reverse holds when φ(e) > 1/2.9
To summarize, when eﬀort is contractible, only speciﬁce n v ya ﬀects the
optimal contract: the employer compensates the worker for his envy by in-
creasing pay. Moreover, if utility is convex in envy, the optimal contract calls
for proﬁt-sharing. So, though incentives are unnecessary to induce eﬀort, and
are costly because of the worker’s risk-aversion, a pay schedule that resembles
performance pay is optimal. Envy may aﬀect the eﬀort requirement in the
contract, as a result of an income eﬀect and of the employer’s beneﬁtf r o m
weakening the consequences of proﬁt-sharing on the worker’s risk. Lastly,
speciﬁc envy necessarily reduces proﬁt s ,e v e nw h e nt h ew o r k e r ’ se ﬀort may
increase. The reason is that the ﬁrm must compensate the worker fully, both
9This eﬀect relies heavily on the assumed production technology. For instance, it would
not appear if uncertainty in pay stems from additive noise in production, or from additive
noise in the performance measure.
9for the disutility from envy and for the disutility from eﬀort.
4.2 Noncontractible eﬀort
Suppose now that eﬀort is not contractible. Workers make two decisions:
whether to participate and, if so, how hard to work. We solve the model by
backward induction.
When choosing eﬀort, the worker’s expected utility is:
U = φ(e)u(wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]u(wL) − c(e)
−γ {φ(e)v(H − wH) − [1 − φ(e)]v(L − wL)}. (8)
Note that, by the deﬁnition of general and speciﬁc envy, it does not matter
whether envy is general or speciﬁca tt h em o m e n tt h ew o r k e rc h o o s e se ﬀort.
The worker’s ﬁrst-order condition for optimal eﬀort is:
φ
0(e)[u(wH) − u(wL)] − c
0(e) − γφ
0(e)[v(H − wH) − v(L − wL)] = 0. (9)
Clearly, when incentive pay is less than the worker’s marginal product (that
is, wH − wL <H− L), envy reduces the worker’s eﬀort. The reason is that
the worker’s eﬀort increases his employer’s proﬁt, making the worker more
envious. Though envy reduces the worker’s eﬀo r tg i v e nt h ep o w e ro ft h e




















00(e){u(wH) − u(wL) − γ [v(H − wH) − v(L − wL)]} > 0.
Besides the usual eﬀect, stronger incentives imply that the employer gains
less from marginal eﬀort. This gives envious workers an additional incentive
to work harder when incentive pay increases.10
10In addition to this ﬁrst-order eﬀect, envy further magniﬁes the eﬀect of incentive pay
on eﬀort if there are decreasing returns to eﬀort, φ
00(e) < 0; see the second-order condition.
10The employer maximizes proﬁts subject to the worker’s participation con-
s t r a i n t ,s ot h a tt h ee m p l o y e r ’ so b j e c t i v ei st o
max
wH,wL
φ(e)(H − wH)+[ 1− φ(e)](L − wL) subject to (2),
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¾
=0 (10)













0(e)[v(H − wH) − v(L − wL)]
¾
=0 (11)
φ(e)u(wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]u(wL) − c(e)
−βγ{φ(e)v(H − wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]v(L − wL)} = U, (12)
where λ i st h eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e ra n dt h et e r m si nl a r g eb r a c k e t sh a v eb e e n
simpliﬁed using the ﬁrst-order condition for eﬀort (9).
When v(·) is linear, the optimization problem has a simple solution. Com-
bining (10) and (11) and letting v(·) be linear shows that the optimal contract
has
wH − wL = H − L −




Clearly, when workers are risk neutral [u0(wL)=u0(wH)], for all values of γ
proﬁt maximization requires full incentives (that is, wH−wL = H−L). When
workers are risk averse [u0(wL) >u 0(wH)], the employer always sets partial
incentives (that is, wH − wL <H− L). Optimal incentives decline with the
degree of risk aversion and with the uncertainty about the equilibrium level
11of output, measured by φ(e)[1 − φ(e)]. Optimal incentives increase with the
eﬀect of eﬀo r to ne x p e c t e do u t p u t[ φ
0(e)]. Lastly, and most importantly, the
marginal incentive an employer oﬀers increases with the importance of envy
(as captured by γ) to the worker. The reason is that incentives induce more
eﬀort when workers are envious, making it more costly to weaken incentives
for risk-sharing reasons.11Note that when v(·) is linear, optimal incentive
pay is independent of whether envy is speciﬁc or general. As in the previous
section, the kind of envy does matter for total compensation. As is clear
from the participation constraint (12), the worker earns more when envy is
speciﬁc( w h e nβ =1 ) than when envy is general (when β =0 ).
When v(·) is convex and envy is speciﬁc( β =1 ), optimal incentive pay
is:
wH − wL = H − L
−
φ(e)[1 − φ(e)]{u0(wL) − u0(wH) − γ[v0(H − wH) − v0(L − wL)]}s
[φ
0(e)]2[u0(wH)+γv0(H − wH)][u0(wL)+γv0(L − wL)]
. (14)
Note, as apparent from the last term in brackets in the numerator, the con-
vexity of v(·) enhances the eﬀect of envy on incentive pay. This is the eﬀect
that also appeared for contractible eﬀort: if envy is speciﬁc( β =1 )p r o ﬁt-
sharing reduces the expected wage cost as the worker suﬀe r sm o r ef r o me n v y
when proﬁt sa r eh i g ht h a nw h e np r o ﬁts are low.
When v(·) is convex and envy is general (β =0 ), optimal incentive pay
11Envy has two additional, indirect, eﬀects on optimal incentive pay. First, if φ
00(e) < 0,
the absolute value of the second-order condition (s) decreases in γ. Following (13), this
further increases optimal incentive pay. The reason is that incentive pay more strongly
aﬀects eﬀort when s is small. Second, there is an indirect eﬀect through φ(e).B yt h eﬁrst-
order condition (9), envy directly reduces eﬀort e. Hence, φ(e) falls, and, if φ
00(e) < 0,
the value of φ
0(e) increases. Following (13), the increase in φ
0(e) implies a further increase
in optimal incentive pay. The decrease in φ(e) has an ambiguous eﬀect, depending on
whether φ(e) ≷ 1/2, that is, depending on whether risk increases or decreases in eﬀort.
12is:
wH − wL = H − L−
φ(e)[1 − φ(e)][u0(wL) − u0(wH)]s
[φ
0(e)]2[u0(wH)u0(wL)+γ[1 − φ(e)]v0(H − wH)u0(wL)+γφ(e)v0(L − wL)u0(wH)]
+( γ[v(H − wH) − v(L − wL)])
µ
[1 − φ(e)][u0(wH)+γv0(H − wH)] + φ(e)[u0(wL)+γv0(L − wL)]




Note that here again the convexity of v(·) ampliﬁes the eﬀect of envy on
optimal incentive pay. The intuition is clear from the ﬁrst-order conditions
(10) and (11). Recall that when β =0 , the worker envies the employer even
when another worker takes the job. Envy therefore does not directly aﬀect
t h ew o r k e r ’ sd e c i s i o nt ot a k et h ej o b .B u to n c eo nt h ej o b ,t h ew o r k e r ’ se n v y
induces him to work less than he otherwise would; eﬀort declines the most
when incentive pay is low (see (9)). The reduced eﬀort reduces the worker’s
utility for a given level of envy. Since, in equilibrium, envy is given (that is,
independent of the worker’s participation), the worker must be compensated
for this by a higher base salary. In other words, when β =0and eﬀort is
non-contractible, the worker anticipates that when he is hired, his envy will
induce him to exert little eﬀort, and so envy indirectly aﬀects the worker’s
willingness to participate. Higher incentive pay reduces the eﬀect of envy on
eﬀort, relaxing the worker’s participation constraint. As before, when v(·) is
convex, the employer can reduce the expected wage he will pay and thereby
increase expected proﬁts, by giving stronger incentives. The only diﬀerence
from the result with speciﬁc envy is that under general envy the eﬀect is
indirect through the worker’s choice of eﬀort.
The total eﬀect of envy on worker’s eﬀo r ti si n d e t e r m i n a t e .O nt h eo n e
hand, envy directly reduces eﬀort, as shown by the ﬁrst-order condition (9).
On the other hand, the ﬁrm sets higher incentive pay, inducing higher eﬀort.
The total eﬀe c td e p e n d so nt h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o na n do nt h es h a p eo f
the function describing the disutility from envy.
In short, when eﬀort is not contractible, envy reduces worker’s eﬀort for
given level of incentives, but ampliﬁes the eﬀect of incentives on eﬀort. Con-
sequently, the employer oﬀers stronger incentives. Moreover, when utility is
convex in envy, optimal incentive pay increases with envy so as to reduce
13the worker’s expected disutility from envy and, hence, reduce wage compen-
sation. Eﬀort may either increase or decrease in envy. Proﬁts are, however,
always lower when workers are envious, even when envy results in higher
eﬀort. The reason is that the ﬁrm must fully compensate the worker for
his higher eﬀort. This also holds when envy is general and, hence, cannot
be escaped. If the ﬁrm incompletely compensates for the cost of eﬀort, any
one person then prefers that some other person take the job. When envy
is speciﬁc, the ﬁrm must also compensate the worker for the disutility from
envy.
5 Envy depends on relative income
Suppose now that the worker’s envy increases with the diﬀerence in income
between the employer and the worker. Again, we ﬁrst consider contractible
eﬀort and then consider noncontractible eﬀort. To avoid repetition of argu-
ments, we focus our discussion on the implications of letting envy depend on
relative income rather than only on proﬁts.
5.1 Contractible eﬀort
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the proﬁt-maximizing pay schedule are:
φ
0(e)[H − L − wH + wL]+λ{φ
0(e)[u(wH) − u(wL)] − c
0(e)}
−λγφ
0(e){v(H − 2wH) − v(L − 2wL)}
+λγφ




0(H − 2wH) − (1 − β)γφ(e)v
0(H − wH − w)] = 0 (17)
−[1 − φ(e)] + λ[1 − φ(e)]u
0 (wL)
+λ{2γ [1 − φ(e)]v
0(L − 2wL) − (1 − β)γ[1 − φ(e)]v
0(L − wL − w)} =0
(18)
14φ(e)u(wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]u(wL) − c(e)
−γ {φ(e)v(H − 2wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]v(L − 2wL)}
+γ(1 − β){φ(e)v(H − wH − w)+[ 1− φ(e)]v(L − wL − w)} = U. (19)
Though these conditions closely resemble the conditions we described
above when envy depends on proﬁts, there are two diﬀerences. First, both
speciﬁc and general envy directly aﬀect the worker’s willingness to partic-
ipate. The reason is that, when envy depends on the diﬀerence in income
between the employer and the worker, and when wages diﬀer inside and out-
side the ﬁrm, envious feelings may diﬀer inside and outside. Second, under
speciﬁce n v y( β =1 ), the eﬀect of an increase in pay (either wH or wL)
on the disutility from envy is twice as large. The reason is that, all else
equal, an increase in wi both reduces the employer’s proﬁts and increases the
worker’s income, thus reducing the diﬀerence in income by twice as much as
t h ei n c r e a s ei nc o m p e n s a t i o n .
Combining (17) and (18) yields:
u
0 (wL) − u
0 (wH)=2 γ[v
0(H − 2wH) − v
0(L − 2wL)]. (20)
As in the previous section, when utility is convex in envy a trade-oﬀ appears
between the risk borne by the worker and the expected disutility from envy,
implying that some proﬁt-sharing is optimal. In contrast to the previous
section, proﬁt-sharing is optimal even when envy is general. The reason is
that when envy depends on the diﬀerence in income, the expected disutility
from envy is no longer a constant. Making pay increase with output reduces
the expected disutility from envy more when the person works inside the
ﬁrm than when he is outside it. Hence, working for the ﬁrm becomes more
attractive compared to the outside option, allowing the ﬁrm to reduce the
base salary.
A second important diﬀerence with the results in the previous section is
that the expected disutility from envy is minimized when wH − wL =( H −
L)/2. That is, the employer should pay half of the marginal product instead
of the full marginal product.12The intuition is that when the worker is paid
12Some data support this prediction. Young and Burke (2001) show that in their sample
of Illinois farms, almost all contracts have the same tenant share for all types of crops,
and this share is one-half for 80% of the contracts.
15a lump-sum plus half his marginal product, the diﬀerence in income between
the employer and the worker can be made invariant with output.13When v(·)
is convex, and given the expected value of the income diﬀerential, the worker
prefers a stable to an uncertain income diﬀerential. Since the compensation
schedule has no incentive eﬀects, and since the risk-neutral employer only
cares about expected proﬁts, not about the distribution of proﬁts over states,
the employer chooses the distribution of pay that maximizes the worker’s
utility, thus enabling the employer to reduce expected wage costs. Comparing
(20) to (7), it follows that envy which varies with relative income may induce
less proﬁt-sharing than does envy which varies with proﬁts. We should be
careful, however, in comparing the two cases because the functions v(·) in
the two cases can diﬀer. We are sure, however, that if envy depends on the
diﬀerence in incomes, then when the importance of envy to the worker rises
(when γ increases), or when risk-aversion falls, the optimal level of wH −wL
converges to half of the marginal product. If instead envy depends on proﬁts,
optimal pay converges to the full marginal product.
5.2 Noncontractible eﬀort
Consider next noncontractible eﬀort. The worker chooses that level of eﬀort
which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
φ
0(e)[u(wH) − u(wL)] − c
0(e) − γφ
0(e)[v(H − 2wH) − v(L − 2wL)] = 0.
Note that envy may now increase or reduce eﬀort. When wH − wL < (H −
L)/2, envy reduces eﬀort, as before. But when wH − wL > (H − L)/2,e n v y
motivates eﬀort, even though eﬀort enriches the employer. The reason is
that when incentive pay exceeds half the marginal product, eﬀort reduces
the expected diﬀerence in income between the employer and the worker,















13Note that given that the employer always ends up richer than the worker, a pay
system with full incentives results in high income inequality when output is low, whereas
the absence of incentive pay results in high income inequality when output is high.





00(e){u(wH) − u(wL) − γ [v(H − 2wH) − v(L − 2wL)]} > 0.
Stronger incentives make that eﬀort becomes more rewarding in terms of
income, but also that the diﬀerence in income between the employer and the
worker increases less (or decreases more) with eﬀort. Hence, an increase in
incentive pay further motivates eﬀort by an envious worker.





0(e)[H − wH − L + wL]
+λ{φ(e)u
0 (wH)+2 γφ(e)v
0(H − 2wH) − (1 − β)γφ(e)v






0(e)[v(H − wH − w) − v(L − wL − w)]
¶
=0 (21)




0(e)[H − wH − L + wL]
+λ{[1 − φ(e)]u
0 (wL)+2 γ [1 − φ(e)]v
0(L − 2wL) − (1 − β)γ[1 − φ(e)]v






0(e)[v(H − wH − w) − v(L − wL − w)]
¶
=0 (22)
φ(e)u(wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]u(wL) − c(e)
−γ {φ(e)v(H − 2wH)+[ 1− φ(e)]v(L − 2wL)}
+(1 − β)γ {φ(e)v(H − wH − w)+[ 1− φ(e)]v(L − wL − w)} = U. (23)
We ﬁrst solve for the proﬁt-maximizing pay schedule when v(·) is linear.
Combining (22) and (23) yields
wH − wL = H − L −




The result much resembles that of the previous section; compare (13). Opti-
mal incentive pay is higher when workers are envious because incentives have
al a r g e re ﬀect on eﬀort.
17When v(·) is convex, and envy is speciﬁc( β =1 ), optimal incentive pay
is
wH − wL = H − L
−
φ(e)[1 − φ(e)][u0(wL) − u0(wH) − 2γ[v0(H − 2wH) − v0(L − 2wL)]]s
[φ
0(e)]2[u0(wH)+2 γv0(H − 2wH)][u0(wL)+2 γv0(L − 2wL)]
(25)
As before, the convexity of v(·) makes some proﬁt-sharing, which reduces the
expected disutility from envy, optimal. This eﬀect is captured by the last
term in the numerator. Note that the eﬀect of envy on optimal incentive pay
becomes ambiguous. Though envy ampliﬁes the eﬀect of incentives on eﬀort
and, therefore, increases optimal incentive pay (see the terms in the denomi-
nator), proﬁt-sharing may call for lower incentives. This occurs when, apart
from proﬁt-sharing reasons, optimal incentive pay is higher than half the
marginal product. Then lowering incentive pay reduces uncertainty about
the diﬀerence in income and thus, as v(·) is convex, reduces the expected
disutility from envy. When, apart from proﬁt-sharing reasons, optimal in-
centive pay is less than half of the marginal product (for instance, when
the worker is suﬃciently risk averse), envy unambiguously increases optimal
incentive pay.




0(H − 2wH) − φ(e)v




0(L − 2wL) − [1 − φ(e)]v







Optimal incentive pay is:








0(wH) − γ [2v
0(H − 2wH) − v
0(H − wH − w) − 2v
0(L − 2wL)+v
0(L − wL − w)]}
+ γ[v(H − wH − w) − v(L − wL − w)]
½




To understand the diﬀerences between (25) and (26), consider the ﬁrst-order
conditions (21) and (22). These show two additional eﬀects under general
envy, described by the last two terms in brackets.
18First, because the ﬁrm’s pay schedule now also aﬀects the worker’s envy
when another worker takes the job, the pay schedule has a smaller eﬀect on
the participation constraint when envy is general. Comparing the numerators
in the ﬁrst fractions in (25) and (26, (third line)) shows that this reduces
optimal incentive pay. The reason is as follows. For a given level of eﬀort,
weaker incentives imply higher proﬁts. Since wages elsewhere are unaﬀected
by the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer, higher proﬁts increase the envy suﬀered by a person
working outside the ﬁrm, allowing the ﬁrm to reduce the base salary.
Second, working in the opposite direction, is an indirect eﬀect through
eﬀort, described by the last terms in brackets in the ﬁrst-order conditions
(21) and (22). The intuition is the following. Higher incentive pay increases
eﬀort. This increases the probability of high output. When the ﬁrm pays less
than the full marginal product, proﬁts will be higher when output is H than
when output is L. As the wage elsewhere is ﬁxed, this implies that the worker
expects to suﬀer more from envy when he chooses the outside option. Higher
incentive pay therefore makes the outside option less attractive, allowing
the ﬁrm to reduce the base salary (see the last term in (26)). As the two
additional eﬀects have opposite signs, it is unclear whether incentive pay will
be higher or lower when envy is speciﬁc compared to when it is general.
6A p p l i c a t i o n s
6.1 Stock options to lower-level workers
Whereas awarding stock options can align the interests of CEOs and share-
holders, it is harder to see why lower-level workers should be granted stock
options, as each individual worker’s eﬀort hardly aﬀects the stock price. Yet,
many ﬁrms oﬀer stock options to non-executive workers (Hall and Murphy
(2003) and Oyer and Schaefer (2004)). Workers’ envy of the manager’s wealth
may be an explanation. As we saw, when utility is convex in envy, the proﬁt-
maximizing compensation schedule is not a ﬂa tw a g e ,e v e nw h e ne ﬀort is fully
contractible. Instead it pays a high wage when output (and hence proﬁt) is
high and a low wage when output (and hence proﬁt) is low. The employer
balances the cost of risk to the worker with the worker’s expected disutility
from envy. These eﬀects can make a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm award stock op-
tions to workers even if any one individual worker’s eﬀort hardly aﬀects the
stock price. When, for incentive reasons, the CEO is awarded stock options,
19workers should be also, so as to reduce the expected disutility from envy.
Workers’ envy may also aﬀect the optimal compensation of the CEO.
When workers’ envy is limited to the CEO’s wealth, and utility is convex in
envy, a grant of stock options to the CEO increases the disutility of workers
from envy, and so requires an increase in workers’ wages. Similarly, when
workers also envy the stockholders’ wealth, but CEOs are wealthier than
the average stockholder, stock options to the CEO may increase wage com-
pensation to workers. Hence, workers’ envy may weaken the stockholders’
incentive to motivate the CEO by awarding stock options.
6.2 Wages are higher at larger establishments
Other things equal, in a large ﬁrm or a large plant, the income of the boss
will be higher. We can think of multiple workers under each boss or owner.
The higher income creates higher envy, and so induces higher wages and
higher-powered incentives. Agell (2003), using a representative survey of
compensation managers, ﬁnds that small establishments rely less on pecu-
niary incentives and report less often that their employees care about relative
pay.
Empirical studies ﬁnd that large employers pay higher wages than smaller
ones, and that this wage premium remains even after controlling for observ-
able characteristics of workers and of ﬁrms. The size eﬀect is large; Brown,
Hamilton and Medoﬀ (1990) show that employees in U.S. companies with
more than 500 employees earn 35 percent more than those in companies
with less than 500 employees. Brown and Medoﬀ (1989), Groshen (1991), Oi
and Idson (1999), and Troske (1999) report and summarize similar results for
the United States. The increase of wages with employer size is also found in
other countries. Arai (2003) reports results for Sweden. Albaek et al. (1998)
present results for the Nordic countries, and provide references to studies for
other non US-countries.
6.3 Proﬁt vs. non-proﬁt organizations
In a privately-held ﬁrm the ﬁrm’s owner is the residual claimant of net
proﬁt. In contrast, in a governmental or non-proﬁt organization the residual
claimants are a large fraction of the public, with incomes typically lower than
those of owners of ﬁrms. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that envy plays
20a less important role for workers outside for-proﬁt ﬁrms.14
The lack of envy means that a worker will be willing to work for a lower
wage at a governmental job. It also means that, when envy depends on
proﬁts or when envy depends on relative income and incentive pay is less
than half of the marginal product, a government worker faced with low-
powered incentives will work harder than he would given the same incentives
at a for-proﬁt ﬁrm. Lastly, non-proﬁt organizations will optimally set weaker
incentives than comparable for-proﬁt organizations.
Empirical evidence indeed suggests that government workers face lower-
powered incentives than do workers in the private sector. Burgess and Met-
calfe (1999) ﬁnd that British ﬁrms in the private sector use incentive wages
more extensively than do ﬁrms in the public sector, even after controlling for
occupation, union density, and work force composition. They conclude that
incentives in the public sector are suboptimally weak. Our analysis shows
that the lack of envy in the public sector may be an explanation. Kikeri and
Nellis (2002) discuss several studies which ﬁnd an increase in performance-
based incentives for workers in privatized ﬁrms. Martin and Parker (1997)
report similar evidence for several British ﬁrms. Other evidence shows that
governmental workers are paid less. Borjas (2002) shows that public sector
workers in the United States earn about 5 to 10 percent less than comparable
workers in the private sector. Moreover, several studies ﬁnd that wages at
ﬁrms increased after privatization in the United Kingdom. (See Bishop and
Kay (1988), Haskel and Szymanski (1993), and Parker and Martin (1996)).
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) ﬁn dt h es a m ef o rM e x i c o ,a n dB r a i n e r d
(2002) for Russia.15
14For the same reason, corporate taxes and progressive taxation may reduce workers’
envious feelings in for-proﬁt ﬁrms, as the worker’s marginal product contributes less to
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Hence, corporate taxes and progressive taxes may increase the output
of lower-level workers. See also Agell and Lundborg (1992)’s study on the eﬀects of tax
policies on output and unemployment in a general equilibrium model where workers care
about the functional distribution of income.
15The literature oﬀers some other explanations for low-powered incentives in govern-
ment: the absence of market discipline (Niskanen (1971), Hanushek (1996), Acemoglu,
Kremer, and Mian (2003)), optimal design of governmental agencies to limit collusion and
corruption (Crozier (1967), Tirole (1986), and Banerjee (1997)), problems arising from the
multi-task, multi-principal nature of many government jobs (Dixit (2002)), and selection
and motivation of workers with a public service motivation (Francois (2000 and 2003),
Delfgaauw and Dur (2002), Besley and Ghatak (2003)).
217C o n c l u s i o n
We examined the behavior of a worker who envies his employer, and char-
acterized the employment contracts that may result. Our analysis implies
t h a tt h ee m p l o y e r ’ sp r o ﬁt sa r el o w e rt h em o r et h ew o r k e r se n v yt h eo w n e r
or manager. One way of reducing envy is to hide the total amount of ex-
ecutive compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Another way to reduce
envy is to make other attributes of the manager’s job appear unattractive
to his subordinates. Requirements for credentials (such as an MBA degree)
by managers, can make executive positions appear less attractive to some
workers, and thus reduce their envy. The nasty and brutal campaigns that
candidates for political oﬃce endure, and the continued scrutiny by the press,
can make citizens little envy a governor or senator, and therefore more willing
t ow o r ko nh i sb e h a l f .T h ed i ﬃculty of Oﬃcer Candidate School in the mil-
itary can similarly make enlisted soldiers more willing to obey their oﬃcers.
In short, many phenomena which appear to ﬁt a signaling story which sorts
diﬀerent types of people into diﬀerent positions, may instead or in addition
reduce envy of superiors.
Our reasoning can be applied not only to production, but also to con-
sumption. (See Rotemberg (2003) for a related argument based on recipro-
cal behavior). Suppose that a consumer envies the wealth of the sellers of
goods. As Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), for example, document,
consumers may refuse to buy from ﬁrms that are seen to proﬁteer from nat-
ural disasters. Similarly, Olmstead and Rhode (1985) tell the fascinating
story of California oil companies in the 1920s. Standard Oil of California,
the dominant ﬁrm and price-setter, refused to raise gasoline prices when the
real price of light crude doubled. Similarly, during the 1979 gasoline crisis
large oil companies such as Exxon and Mobil posted lower prices for gasoline
and heating oil than did small companies (Erﬂe, Pound, and Kalt 1981; Erﬂe
and McMillan 1990). In our terms, we can think of a consumer’s utility as
increasing with his consumer surplus, and decreasing with the seller’s proﬁts.
If price equals marginal cost, the quantity a consumer buys does not aﬀect
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. But the more price exceeds marginal cost, the higher the
proﬁts to the seller on each additional unit sold. Envy will then reduce de-
mand. Or stated diﬀerently, envy makes demand more elastic, inducing the
seller to charge a lower price than he would in the absence of envy. And,
in analogy with our analysis of production, an increase in the tax rate on
proﬁts will increase consumer demand.
228N o t a t i o n
c(e) Cost of eﬀort
e Eﬀort
e Outside option eﬀort
H Firm’s revenue when production is high
L Firm’s revenue when production is low
u(wi) Worker’s utility from income
v(x) Worker’s disutility from envy
U Worker’s utility
U Worker’s envy-free outside option utility
wi Wage when productivity is i
w Worker’s outside option wage
φ(e) Probability that production is high
γ Weight on envy in the worker’s utility function
Π Proﬁts
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